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I.  INTRODUCTION
Since the crisis in Syria began in 2011, Europe and many other nations
have experienced a massive influx of refugees and asylum seekers fleeing
their war-torn country.1 The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(“UNHCR”) estimated that Turkey hosted over one million Syrian refugees
as of August 2014.2 
Many Syrian refugees have also fled to Europe, where there has been a 
large spike in the number of asylum applicants, and that number has
steadily grown since 2013.3 Between January and July 2013, over 225,000 
asylum applications were lodged in 38 European countries, which was a 
23% increase from the same period in 2012; of these, over 192,000
applications were made in EU States.4 The number of refugee applicants 
continues to climb according to Eurostat data, which reported that the 
number of first time asylum applicants increased by 86% in the first quarter 
of 2015, compared with the same quarter of the previous year.5 Many of
those asylum applicants are concentrated in European border counties, such as
Italy, which has seen a 27% increase of asylum applications from 2014 to 
2015, and Greece, which has seen a 30% increase of applicants over the same
time period.6 Hungary has also seen a large increase in asylum applicants.
Hungary’s number of asylum applications has doubled in 2014. The country
has had nearly 150,000 arrivals since the beginning of 2015 and, at one 
point, up to 3,000 asylum seekers crossing the Hungary-Serbia border every
day for a week.7 
Because of the large number of refugees flooding into European border
countries, the living conditions of the refugees once they reach those nations 
are below the nationally and internationally required standards.8 According 
to Human Rights Watch, refugees who were waiting to be processed for
 1. See UNHCR, Europe, GLOBAL APPEAL 2015 UPDATE 130–31, http://www.unhcr. 
org/5461e5f80.pdf [https://perma.cc/73TS-4249]. 
2. Id.
 3. See UNHCR, Europe, GLOBAL APPEAL 2014-2015 109, http://www.unhcr.org/
528a0a1ab.pdf [https://perma.cc/3L2K-JE3N].
4. Id.
 5. See Eurostat, Asylum Quarterly Report 1, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/
6049358/7005580/Q1_2015_SE+article.pdf [https://perma.cc/PKD7-5KKD].
6. Council Decision 2015/1601, Establishing Provisional Measures in the Area of 
International Protection for the Benefit of Italy and Greece, 2015 O.J. (L 248) 80, 81 (EU)
[hereinafter Provisional Measures].
7. Hungary: Abysmal Conditions in Border Detention, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept.
11, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/11/hungary-abysmal-conditions-border­
detention [https://perma.cc/8DZP-GZE7].
8. Eva Cosse, Dispatches: Let Refugees on Buses, Greece, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Sept. 11, 2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/09/11/dispatches-let-refugees-buses-greece 
[https://perma.cc/6CX7-6YHC].
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asylum in the Greek city of Mytilene had no toilets or showers to use, and 
had to buy their own tents, food, and water.9 In Serbia, Human Rights Watch 
interviewed migrants and asylum seekers who described violent assaults, 
threats, insults, and extortion, as well as being denied the mandatory
special protection for unaccompanied children.10 In Hungary, police 
intercepted asylum seekers and placed them in tightly-packed hangars for 
detention.11 While being held in these hangars, asylum seekers have been 
denied interpreters, given sparse access to food and bedding, and, due to
the lack of drinkable water, forced to drink unclean water that is provided
for washing.12 The detainees are also denied medical attention, and some even
described instances in which they saw other detainees experience heart attacks,
insulin shock or seizures, and newborns with serious fevers.13 
Border countries, such as Greece, Italy, and Hungary, have the unequal 
task and responsibility of caring for the asylum seekers due to the EU 
regulations that manage asylum, which are governed in large part by the 
Dublin Regulation.14 The Dublin Regulation is a decision drafted by the
European Parliament and the Council of European Union that assigns the 
responsibility of processing the asylum seekers application to the first EU
Member State the asylum seeker enters.15 If an asylum seeker moves to 
another nation, other than the nation he or she first entered, then the
Dublin Regulation allows a state to ask the first state responsible for the
application to take charge or to take back the asylum seeker.16 This idea
is based on the principle that responsibility primarily lies with the Member
State that played the greatest role in the asylum seeker’s entry into the
EU.17 Due to the hierarchical criteria and lack of burden-sharing provisions 
in the Dublin Regulation, asylum applications are not equally shared 
9. Id. 
10. Serbia: Police Abusing Migrants, Asylum Seekers, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Apr. 15,
2015), https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/15/serbia-police-abusing-migrants-asylum-seekers
[https://perma.cc/C7B9-BC5A].
11. Hungary: Abysmal Conditions in Border Detention, supra note 7.
 12. Id.
 13. Id.
 14. See Tina Van den Sanden, Case Law: Joined Cases C411/10, N.S. v. Sec’y of State
for the Home Dep’t, 19 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 143, 145–46 (2012). 
15. Council Regulation 604/2013, Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms for
Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an application for international 
protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless 
person (recast), 2013 O.J. (L 180) 31, 37 (EU) [hereinafter Dublin III]. 
16.  Van den Sanden, supra note 14, at 147. 
17. Id.
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between all Member States.18 Countries like Greece, Hungary, and Italy, 
are burdened with an unequal portion of the refugees,19 which results in 
flaws in the way asylum seekers are processed.
This comment will discuss the systemic flaws in the Dublin Regulation 
and in the Member States’ asylum procedures, as well as the need for
specificity in the definition of the “systemic flaws” discussed in the
Dublin Regulation. Section II will explain the history and source of obligation 
underlying the Dublin Regulation, and will also detail its development
since its inception. Section III will explore the meaning of “systemic 
flaws” found in Article 3 of the Dublin Regulation. Section III will also discuss 
the cases decided by the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) and
the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”), pertaining to “systemic flaws” and
how those cases have influenced the Dublin Regulation. Section IV will
analyze the early warning mechanism found in Article 33 of the Regulation, 
and the role of mutual trust in EU law, and the impact on the function of
the Regulation. Section IV will also explore the practical application of 
the Dublin Regulation, and the current solutions the EU has tried to implement
in Greece, Italy, and Hungary. Lastly, Section V will propose changes to 
the Dublin Regulation, which includes a specific definition of what systemic 
flaws are, an automatic barring of sending refugees to a country that is found 
to have systemic flaws, and exploring a fair and equal sharing system
to alleviate the burden on border countries. 
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE DUBLIN REGULATION
The obligation that each EU Member State has to accept asylum seekers 
is found in The Charter of Fundamental Rights (“The Charter”),20 and, for
EU Members that are part of the Council of Europe as well, simultaneously
from an obligation under the European Convention of Human Rights 
(“ECHR”).21 The Dublin Regulation is a mechanism that assigns responsibility 
to Member States for asylum seekers.22 The Dublin Regulation derives its 
authority from the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”).23 The Dublin Regulation 
18. Id.
 19. Id.
 20. See EUROPEAN UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, HANDBOOK ON
EUROPEAN LAW RELATING TO ASYLUM, BORDERS AND IMMIGRATION 20 (2d ed. 2014),
http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/handbook-law-asylum-migration-borders-2nded_en.
pdf [https://perma.cc/AV6F-X9VM] [hereinafter EU HANDBOOK].
21. Id. at 15–16. 
22. See SUSAN FRATZKE, NOT ADDING UP: THE FADING PROMISE OF EUROPE’S DUBLIN
SYSTEM 1 (2015).
23. See EU HANDBOOK, supra note 20. 
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has been revised twice in the 26 years since its inception in 1990,24 and 
has been kept in compliance with the treaties and obligations listed above.25 
A. Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European 

Convention of Human Rights 

The EU is made up of 28 Member States.26 Its two main treaties, the
TEU and the TFEU, have been approved by all EU Member States and
are referred to as “primary EU law.”27 The EU’s regulations, directives, 
and decisions have been adopted by the EU institutions that have been 
given authority to do so under the treaties, and they are often referred to 
as “secondary EU law.”28 Under the EU treaties, the EU established its 
own court, the ECJ, which has since been renamed the Court of Justice of 
the European Union (“CJEU”).29 
In 2000, the EU promulgated the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR), 
and when the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on December 1, 2009, 
the EU made the CFR legally binding.30 As a result, according to Article 
51 of the CFR, EU institutions, bodies, offices, agencies, and Member
States are bound to comply with the CFR when implementing EU law.31 
The CFR contains a list of human rights inspired by the rights enshrined 
in EU Member States’ constitutions and the ECHR.32 
For the first time at a European-wide level, the CFR prescribed a right 
to asylum.33 Article 18 in the CFR guarantees “[t]he right to asylum . . . 
with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Convention . . . relating to the 
status of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European 
Community.”34 
Article 19 of the CFR grants protection in the event of removal, expulsion 
or extradition, and provides that “[c]ollective expulsions are prohibited,” 
24. See FRATZKE, supra note 22, at 3. 
25. See generally Dublin III, supra note 15, at 31–35 (providing instances when regulation
is in accordance with the CFR, ECHR, TEU, and TFEU).
26. See EU HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 17. 
27. Id.
 28. Id.
 29. Id. at 19. 
30. Id. at 20–21. 
31. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 51, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 
389, 402 [hereinafter CFR]. 
32. See EU HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 20. 
33. Id. at 21. 
34. See CFR, supra note 31, art. 18. 
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and that “no one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where 
there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty,
torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”35 
Lastly, Article 52 of the CFR stipulates that the minimum protection 
afforded by the CFR provisions are those provided by the ECHR; nevertheless, 
the EU may apply a more generous interpretation of the rights than that 
put forward by the ECtHR.36 
The 28 members of the EU that are part of the Council of Europe 
(“Council”) have obligations to asylum seekers under the Council as well.37 
The Council was formed after the Second World War to unite the nations 
of Europe.38 The Council adopted the ECHR in 1950.39 The Council then
created the ECtHR in order to enforce the laws of the ECHR.40 As of 
December 2013, the Council was composed of 47 States, 28 of which were 
also members of the EU.41 
The ECHR protects asylum seekers through Article 1 of the ECHR and 
Article 1 of Protocol 7 of the ECHR.42 Article 1 requires states to “secure” 
the Convention rights to “everyone within their jurisdiction,” which includes 
foreigners.43 Article 1 of Protocol 7 of the ECHR provides procedural 
safeguards relating to expulsion of aliens, and states that “[a]n alien
lawfully resident in the territory of a State shall not be expelled therefrom 
except in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law” and
gives the “alien” the right to have his or her case reviewed and to be
represented in court.44 
B. The Dublin Convention
In 1990, the Member States of the European Community, what is now 
known as the European Union, first negotiated the Dublin Convention 
(“Convention”) in 1990.45 It was negotiated in response to the implementation 
of the Schengen Agreement,46 which was signed in 1985, and led to the
 35. See CFR, supra note 31, art. 19. 
36. See EU HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 21. 





 42. Id. at 15–16. 
43. Id. at 16. 
44. Protocol No. 7 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, Nov. 11, 1984, C.E.T.S. 117, art. 1.
 45. See FRATZKE, supra note 22, at 3. 
46. Id. at 4. 
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abolition of internal border controls of participating EU Member States.47 
With the removal of the EU internal borders, asylum seekers could move
around European countries easier, and disputes for who had the responsibility
of filing asylum seeker’s applications soon became an issue.48 Therefore, 
the Convention was created to help determine which Member State had
responsibility over an asylum seeker.49 The Convention, however, was 
also created for two other important purposes: (1) to prevent delayed access
to protection for an asylum seeker if no Member State claimed responsibility, 
and (2) to preclude asylum seekers from choosing a Member State they perceived
as most favorable (asylum shopping).50 Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the
United Kingdom initially signed the Convention.51 Austria later signed the 
Convention in 1997, and Finland signed in 1998.52 
C. Dublin Regulation II and III 
The Dublin Regulation (“Dublin II”) replaced the Dublin Convention 
in 2003.53 Dublin II was created to establish a mechanism to swiftly determine 
the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application, and 
to ensure that all asylum claims received a substantive examination.54 It 
also introduced the use of EURODAC, which is a database for recording 
fingerprint data of asylum applicants.55 All EU Member States except
Denmark acceded to Dublin II.56 
In 2013, the European Council and Parliament agreed upon a revision
of the Dublin Regulation (“Dublin III”) that came into effect in January 
2014.57 Dublin III clarified the hierarchy of criteria determining Member
State responsibility and established a mechanism to warn of potential 
47. See EU HANDBOOK, supra note 20, at 18. 
48. See FRATZKE, supra note 22, at 4. 
49. European Community, Convention Determining the State Responsible for Examining 
Applications for Asylum Lodged in One of the Member States of the European Communities, 
Aug. 19, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 254) 1 [hereinafter Dublin Convention]. 
50. See FRATZKE, supra note 22, at 4. 
51. Id. at 3. 
52. Id.
 53. Id.
 54. Id. at 4. 
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problems with Member States’ asylum systems.58 Most importantly, Dublin 
III prohibited the transfer of asylum seekers to states with “systemic flaws,”59 
and it introduced an early warning and preparedness mechanism to identify
deficiencies in Member States’ asylum systems before they developed into a
crisis.60 
III.  SYSTEMIC FLAWS
The term “systemic flaws,” as it pertains to asylum seekers, first developed 
through the cases M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece decided by the ECtHR, and
the joint cases of N.S. v. Secretary of State and M.E. v. Refugee Applications 
Commissioner, decided by the ECJ (now the CJEU).61 The language used
in N.S./M.E was later used in the Dublin III recast,62 however, Dublin III
does not provide any further definition of a “systemic flaw” that would
require Member States to halt transfers.63 
A. M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR decided M.S.S. v. Belgium & Greece
in 2011.64 It was the first time that socio-economic circumstances were 
considered in judging a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR,65 which provides 
that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.”66 
The applicant in M.M.S. v. Belgium & Greece was an Afghan national 
who entered the EU through Greece before arriving in Belgium, where he 
applied for asylum.67 Belgium asked the Greek authorities to take responsibility
for the asylum applicant68 in accordance with Article 10(1) of Dublin II 
because Greece was the first State of entry.69 Despite a letter from the
 58. Id.
 59. Id. at 11. 
60. Id. at 21. 
61. See Van den Sanden, supra note 14, at 149–52. 
62. See FRATZKE, supra note 22, at 11. 
63. Id. at 22. 
64. M.S.S. v. Belgium, 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 255 (2011), http://www.echr.coe.int/ 
Documents/Reports_Recueil_2011-I.pdf [https://perma.cc/2UXH-QRZV].
65. See Van den Sanden, supra note 14, at 149. 
66. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Nov. 4, 1950, C.E.T.S. No. 005 [hereinafter ECHR].
67.  M.S.S., 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 257. 
68. Id.
 69. See Council Regulation 343/2003, Establishing the Criteria and Mechanisms
for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an Asylum Application
Lodged in One of the Member States by a Third-Country National, art. 10(1), 2003 O.J. 
(L 50) 1 (EC) [hereinafter Dublin II Regulation]. 
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UNHCR, which criticized Greek asylum procedures and reception 
conditions of asylum seekers in Greece, the Belgian authorities found no
reason to believe that Greece would fail to honor its obligations as the 
responsible Member State under EU law and its obligations under the 
1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.70 On June 15,
2009, the applicant was transferred to Greece, where he was immediately 
placed in detention for four days in allegedly appalling conditions.71 The 
applicant was eventually released, but was forced to live on the streets.72 
The applicant spent months living in a state of extreme poverty and lacked
food, proper hygiene, and a place to live.73 The applicant was also in constant 
fear of being attacked and robbed.74 
The court found that Greece had violated Article 3 of the ECHR75 when 
Greece detained the asylum seeker.76 Generally, a state’s treatment of an 
asylum seeker is “inhuman” under Article 3 when it is premeditated, applied 
for hours at a stretch, and causes either actual bodily injury or intense
physical or mental suffering.77 Article 3 also states that treatment is “degrading”
when it: (1) humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect
for, or diminishing, his or her human dignity, or (2) arouses feelings of fear, 
anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual’s moral and physical 
resistance, or (3) when a victim is humiliated in his or her own eyes, even
if not in the eyes of others.78 The court found that the conditions the 
applicant had experienced in detention, such as, the lack of sufficient ventilation,
being forced to urinate in bottles, sleeping on the bare floor, and the lack of 
soap and toilet paper, amounted to a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.79 
The court also found that the Greek authorities violated Article 3 by not
providing the applicant adequate living conditions.80 The Court concluded
that the applicant had been the victim of humiliating and disrespectful
treatment, and that his situation of homelessness “aroused in him feelings
70.  M.S.S., 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 266–67. 




 75. See ECHR, supra note 66, art. 3 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”).
76. See M.S.S., 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 312. 
77. Id. at 308. 
78. Id.
 79. Id. at 311–12. 
80. Id. at 318. 
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of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of inducing desperation.”81 The
court further stated that the applicant’s living conditions, combined with 
the prolonged uncertainty in which he had remained, and the lack of any 
prospects of his situation improving, amounted to a violation of Article 
Lastly, the court found that there had been a violation of Article 1383 of 
the Convention in conjunction with Article 3.84 The court found a violation 
due to deficiencies in the Greek authorities’ examination of the applicant’s
asylum request.85 Because of these deficiencies, the applicant risked being 
returned directly or indirectly to his country of origin without any serious 
examination of the merits of his asylum application and without having
access to an effective remedy.86 
The court concluded that Belgium had also violated Article 3 of the 
ECHR.87 In regards to Belgium, the court concluded that, under Dublin II,
the Belgian authorities could have refrained from transferring the applicant if
they had considered that the receiving country (Greece) was not fulfilling 
its obligations under the ECHR.88 The Court held that it was up to the 
Belgian authorities to first verify how the Greek authorities applied their 
legislation on asylum in practice. Had Belgium done this, they would have 
seen the risk of the degrading conditions in Greece that fell within the 
scope of Article 3.89 




Following M.S.S. v. Belgium, the ECJ ruled on the compatibility of Dublin
II transfers to Greece with fundamental rights for the first time through 
the joined cases of N.S. v. Secretary of State and M.E. v. Refugee Applications 
Commissioner.90 The ECJ referred extensively to the ECtHR’s decision in 




 83. See ECHR, supra note 66, art. 13. 
84. M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 312. 
85. Id. at 64. 
86. Id. at 65. 
87. Id. at 75. 
88. Id. at 71. 
89. Id. at 75. 
90. See Van den Sanden, supra note 14, at 150. 
91. Id. at 152. 
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The asylum applicant in N.S. was an Afghan national who fled his native 
country, and arrived in the United Kingdom after traveling through Greece.92 
He was arrested in Greece on September 24, 2008, but he was unable to
apply for asylum.93 According to the applicant, Greek authorities detained
him for four days, and then gave him an order to leave Greece within 30
days after his release.94 When he tried to leave Greece, he was arrested by 
the police and was expelled to Turkey, and held there for two months.95 
He states that he escaped from detention in Turkey and eventually ended up
in the UK on January 12, 2009, where he lodged an asylum application.96 
Since Greece was the first EU entry point, the UK authorities requested
that Greece take responsibility for the applicant pursuant to Dublin II, and 
after receiving no responses from Greece, the UK, in accordance with 
Dublin II, deemed that Greece had accepted responsibility of the applicant.97 
The applicant opposed this removal, claiming that his removal to Greece
would violate his rights under the ECHR, and therefore, the UK should
accept responsibility of his asylum claim under Article 3(2) of Dublin II.98 
The High Court rejected the applicant’s appeal. The Court of Appeal, however, 
decided it was necessary to refer a number questions to the ECJ.99 
The main question that the court asked was whether the decision by a 
Member State to examine an asylum claim it does not have responsibility
to examine falls within the scope of EU law, specifically under of Article
6 of TEU and Article 15 of the ECHR.100 Put another way, does Article
3(2), which is the decision by a Member State to examine an asylum claim 
it does not have responsibility for, fall within EU law as to bind the
Member States? The other questions relate to human rights, and whether 
92. Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/10, N.S. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t,
2011 ECJ Eur-Lex LEXIS 3290 at 34 (Dec. 21, 2011). 
93. Id.
 94. Id. ¶ 35. 
95. Id.
 96. Id.
 97. Id. ¶ 36.
98. Id. ¶ 39–40; Dublin III art. 3(2) states “Where it is impossible to transfer an
applicant to the Member State primarily designated as responsible because there are 
substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure . . .
resulting in a risk of inhuman or degrading treatment . . . the determining Member State 
shall continue to examine the criteria set out in Chapter III in order to establish whether another 
Member State can be designated as responsible.” Dublin III, supra note 15, art. 3(2). 
99. Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/10, N.S. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t,
2011 ECJ Eur-Lex LEXIS 3290 at 50 (Dec. 21, 2011). 
100. Id.
 305
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or not the obligation to observe EU fundamental rights precluded the
operation of a “conclusive presumption” that the responsible State will 
observe an applicant’s fundamental rights.101 
The other case, C-493/10, M.E., concerned five separate appellants who 
originated, respectively, from Afghanistan, Iran, and Algeria.102 Each of 
them traveled through Greece and then to Ireland, where they claimed
asylum.103 Three of the appellants in the main proceedings claimed 
asylum without disclosing that they had previously been in Greece, while
the other two admitted they had previously been in Greece.104 The 
EURODAC system confirmed that all five appellants had previously
entered Greece, but none of them had claimed asylum there.105 Each appellant 
resisted a return to Greece, and argued that the procedures and conditions 
for asylum seekers in Greece were inadequate.106 The appellants also 
argued that Ireland was required to exercise its power under Article 3(2) 
of the Regulation to accept responsibility for examining and deciding on 
their asylum claims.107 The High Court decided to stay the proceedings
and to refer the following questions to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.108 
The Court’s questions concerned whether the transferring Member
State under the Regulation was obliged to assess the compliance of the 
receiving Member State with Article 18 of the CFR, and if the receiving 
Member State is found not to be in compliance with one or more of those 
provisions, whether the transferring Member Sate is obliged to accept
responsibility for examining the application under Article 3(2) of the
Regulation.109 
The court concluded that the decision by a Member State, on the basis
of Article 3(2) of the Dublin Regulation, to examine an asylum application 
that is not its responsibility according to the criteria laid down in Dublin 
II, implements EU law for the purposes of Article 6 of the TEU and/or
Article 51 of the CFR, and therefore the Member State’s decision to examine 
the applicant must be compatible with the CFR.110 This means that the














Id. ¶ 53. 
Id.
 110. See id. ¶ 69. 
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“[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment.”111 
The court further concluded that EU law precluded a conclusive presumption
that the responsible Member State, which Dublin II indicates as responsible,
observe the fundamental rights of the EU.112 The court also stated that 
Article 4 of the CFR was interpreted to mean that Member States, including 
the national courts, may not transfer an asylum seeker to the “Member
State responsible, within the meaning of the Regulation, where they cannot 
be unaware that systemic deficiencies are present in an asylum procedure.”113 
Meaning that, if a Member State knows of systemic flaws in another
Member State’s asylum procedures, then the first Member State may not 
transfer an asylum seeker back to the flawed State.
The court further stated that there could be no transfer if the reception 
conditions of asylum seekers in that Member State afforded substantial
grounds for believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of 
being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of 
that provision.114 The court echoed similar language used in M.S.S. when 
using the words “inhuman or degrading treatment,” and even referenced 
the M.S.S. decision when determining what would constitute a violation 
of the articles found in the CFR.115 
C. Dublin III Recast 
After the N.S./M.E. decision, there was a near universal halt in Dublin 
transfers to Greece,116 Dublin II was recast, and Dublin III was created, 
which added a new provision echoing the language of the CJEU in N.S./ 
M.E.117 The new provision added in Dublin III prohibited transfers to 
states with “systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and in the reception 
conditions for applicants in that Member State, resulting in a risk of inhuman
or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.”118 
111.  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 9.
112. Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/10, N.S. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t,
2011 ECJ Eur-Lex LEXIS 3290 (Dec. 21, 2011) ¶ 105. 
113. 
114. 





Id. ¶ 112. 
FRATZKE, supra note 22, at 11. 
Id.
118.  Dublin III, supra note 15, art. 3(2). 
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The application of this new provision, however, has been troublesome
because the Dublin Regulation does not provide any further definition of 
systemic flaws.119 Additionally, most member states have been reluctant 
or unable to apply the language of the court used in N.S./M.E. in situations 
such as the inadequate capacity to hold asylum applicants in states such
as Italy or Bulgaria.120 
D. ECtHR Cases After M.S.S. v. Belgium
Since the inception of Dublin III in 2014, there have been multiple cases 
decided by the ECtHR in which the court determined what did and what 
did not constitute a systemic flaw in a Member State’s asylum procedures.121 
For example, the 2014 case of Sharifi and Others v. Italy and Greece, in 
a chamber judgment by the ECtHR, the court held that Greece had violated
Article 13 (the right to an effective remedy) combined with Article 3 of 
the ECHR, and that Italy had also violated Article 3.122 
The case concerned 32 Afghan nationals, two Sudanese nationals, and 
one Eritrean national, who had entered Italy illegally through Greece, and 
then returned to Greece immediately.123 In Greece, they alleged they faced 
subsequent deportation back to their countries of origin that they were
fleeing due to risk of death, torture, and inhuman or degrading treatment.124 
The court found Greece had violated Article 13, combined with Article
3, because of the shortcomings of their asylum procedure, notably a shortage 
of interpreters and the absence of legal aid.125 Greece had also violated
Articles 13 and 3 because of “the state of precariousness and utter destitution”
in the refugee camp, which lead to overcrowded makeshift camps and a
lack of essential services.126  The court found that Italy had violated Article 3 
because of the lack of asylum procedures that put the applicants at a risk
of being deported back to their countries of origin, where they were likely
 119. Id. art. 22.
 120. Id. art. 11.
 121. See generally  EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, DUBLIN CASES (2016)
[hereinafter Dublin Cases], http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Dublin_ENG.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/5F8X-QTBM] (ECHR factsheet of all cases that arose under Dublin since 2014). 
122. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, INDISCRIMINATE COLLECTION EXPULSION
BY THE ITALIAN AUTHORITIES OF AFGHAN MIGRANTS, WHO WERE THEN DEPRIVED OF ACCESS
TO THE ASYLUM PROCEDURE IN GREECE 1 (2014), http://oppenheimer.mcgill.ca/IMG/pdf/
Judgment_Sharifi_v-_Italy_and_Greece_Expulsion_of_Afghan_migrants_from_Italy_to
_Greece.pdf [https://perma.cc/AQX6-8U2K] [hereinafter Sharifi].
123. Id.
 124. Id.
 125. Id. at 4. 
126. Id.
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to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment.127  The applicants
had also complained about ill treatment by the Italian police and crews 
when being transported back to Greece, but the court noted that the complaint 
had not been substantiated and the complaint was manifestly ill-founded 
because the applicants had not provided enough details on the location, 
the nature of the ill-treatment in question, the perpetrators, and the after
effects the treatment had on them.128 
Later that year, The ECtHR found similar violations in Tarakhel v. 
Switzerland, which was decided by the Grand Chamber. The applicants 
were an Afghan couple and their six children, who had first arrived in Italy
from Iran.129 The family left the Italian reception center and eventually 
ended up in Switzerland, where their case was reviewed and denied by Swiss 
authorities, and an order was placed for their removal to Italy.130 The 
applicants contended that their living conditions in the Italian reception 
centers were poor, and included the lack of appropriate sanitation facilities, 
the lack of privacy, and violence among the other occupants.131 
The court held that if the Swiss authorities were to return the applicants 
to Italy, the action would result in a violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.132 
In determining what conditions would fall within an Article 3 violation,
the court held that the ill-treatment of asylum seekers must attain a minimum 
level of severity, and that the circumstances of the case, such as the duration
of the treatment and its physical or mental effects, and, in some instances,
the sex, age and state of health of the victim should be taken into account.133 
The court also held that particular care should be taken when asylum applicants 
are children, even when they are accompanied by their parents, and that 
the reception conditions for children seeking asylum must be suitably
adapted to their age, to ensure that those conditions do not “create [. . .] a
situation of stress and anxiety, with particularly traumatic consequences.”134 
The ECtHR has, however, decided cases where they found no violations 
of Article 3.135 In Mohammadi v. Austria, a chamber decision in 2014, the
 127. Id. at 6. 
128. Id. at 5–6. 
129. 
130. 
 Tarakhel v. Switzerland, App. No. 29217/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 3–4 (2014). 
See id. at 4.
 131. Id. 
132. Id. at 48. 
133. Id. at 47. 
134. Id. at 47–48. 
135. See generally Dublin Cases, supra note 121 (courts found that there were no violations 
in Mohammadi v. Austria, A.M.E. v. the Netherlands, and A.S. v. Switzerland). 
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applicant case, a minor, had lodged an asylum application in Austria, after
crossing though Greece and Hungary.136 The applicant told Austrian
authorities that he did not want to go back to Hungary, because he had been
arrested and detained for three days, was not given enough to eat, was abused
by police, and was woken up during the night by officers.137 Austria rejected
the application, and ordered that the asylum seeker be sent the back to
Hungary.138 Austria took into account a letter that the UNHCR had sent
them.139 The letter by the UNHCR noted that there were problems with 
Hungary’s technique of age assessment, the detention conditions for asylum 
seekers, and the practice of sending asylum-seekers to Serbia if their first
proceedings were terminated.140 Austria, however, noted a lack of sources 
in the UNHCR’s letter, and referred to updated country information obtained
by Austrian asylum authorities that did not indicate systemic deficiencies
in the Hungarian asylum proceedings and reception conditions that would 
have warranted the use of the sovereignty clause in Dublin III.141 
The ECtHR held that if the applicant was expelled to Hungary, he
would not be at risk of treatment in contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR, 
and that the relevant country reports on the situation in Hungary did not 
indicate systemic deficiencies in the Hungarian asylum system.142 The
reports by the UNHCR indicated that detainees had complained about 
poor housing conditions, such as a lack of cleaning materials, inadequate 
water quality, difficulties in practicing their religion, and lack of access 
to specialist medical care, but also noted that, although the centers were 
usually at full capacity, there were no problems with overcrowding. Asylum- 
seekers had outdoor access during the day, each center was equipped with 
a fitness room and computers with internet access, and religious dietary 
requirements were always respected. Furthermore, lawyers, family members, 
and non-governmental organizations were able to access the detention 
centers.143 
Considering the reports, the court reasoned that there is no legal remedy 
against detention in general, only a limit of no more than six months of
detention, and the court held that, although there were shortcomings in 
some of the conditions of detention, there seemed to be an overall sign of 
improvement.144 The court also mentioned the UNHCR had never put in
136. 
137. 
 Mohammadi v. Austria, App. No. 71932/12, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 2 (2014). 
Id.
 138. Id. at 2–3. 
139. Id. at 4. 
140. Id.
 141. Id.
 142. Id. at 17. 
143. Id. at 10. 
144. Id. at 16. 
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their report that EU member states should refrain from transferring asylum
seekers to Hungary under the Regulation.145 Lastly, the court decided not 
to address Hungary’s age assessment policy, because the applicant in the 
present case was no longer a minor,146 and in regards to risk of refoulement 
to Serbia, Hungary had changed their policy and they now examined asylum
applications of Dublin returnees on the merits, instead of automatically
sending them to Serbia.147 
A.M.E. v. the Netherlands was another case where the court found no 
Article 3 violation, and thus, no systemic flaws in the Member State’s
asylum procedures. In A.M.E., the applicant, a Somali national born in 
1994,148 traveled to Italy where he applied for asylum in 2009; applicant 
filed as an adult, stating that he was born in 1985.149 Italy granted the Somalian 
applicant a permanent residence status for three years,150 but applicant left
the reception center in Italy and applied for asylum, as minor, in the
Netherlands.151 The applicant’s request for asylum in the Netherlands was
denied,152 and he was notified that he was to be sent back to Italy.153 In 
subsequent hearings on his asylum request, applicant stated that he lied 
about his age in Italy because he was afraid that admitting he was a minor
would separate him from his countrymen whom he had arrived with in 
Italy.154 The applicant also stated that he was forced to leave the reception 
center in Italy because it was about to be closed down, and he was forced
to live on the streets in horrendous circumstances.155 
In its analysis, the court used the same principles it used in the case of
Tarakhel, which held that whether ill-treatment falls within the scope of 
Article 3 depends on the duration of the treatment and its physical or
mental effects, and the sex, age and state of health of the victim.156 The
court found that the applicant, if returned to Italy, faced no imminent risk 
145. Id.
 146. Id. at 15. 
147. Id. at 17. 
148. 
149. 
 A.M.E. v. the Netherlands, App. No. 51428/10, Eur. Ct. H.R. at 1 (2015). 
Id. at 2. 
150. Id. at 3. 
151. Id. at 2. 
152. Id. at 3. 
153. Id. at 4. 
154. Id. at 4–5. 
155. Id.
 156. See id. at 6.



































of hardship severe enough to fall within the scope of Article 3,157 that the
current structure and situation of reception arrangements in Italy could not 
themselves bar all removals of asylum seekers in Italy, and that conditions 
were not as bad as those in Greece when M.S.S. was decided.158 
In its reasoning, the court noted that the reception center had not yet
closed when the applicant had left, and that the applicant left on his own 
volition.159 Furthermore, the court stated that, unlike the asylum seekers
in Tarakhel, the applicant was not in a family with six minor children, and
was instead a young man with no dependents.160 The court concluded that
because the applicant lied about his age and said that he was an adult, and 
because there was no proof that the Italian authorities acted in bad faith,161 
the Italian authorities were justified in treating him as if he was an adult.162 
In one of the ECtHR’s most recent decisions, A.S. v. Switzerland, the 
court found that the treatment to the applicant by the EU Member States
did not amount an Article 3 violation, and that no systemic flaws were 
found in the State’s asylum procedure. In A.S., the applicant was a Syrian 
national who fled his country and traveled to Greece.163 The applicant then 
moved to Italy, and then to Switzerland where his two sisters lived, and 
where he filed for asylum.164 Switzerland rejected the applicant’s asylum
request because he had already filed in Greece, and because Italian authorities 
accepted a request from Swiss authorities to accept the applicant back into
their country.165 
Applicant claimed that sending him away from his sisters would violate 
Article 3 because he had regained emotional stability in his life, and if he 
were sent back to Italy, where he had no family medical care, his mental 
health problems would be aggravated.166 The applicant produced a medical 
report showing that he suffered from severe post-traumatic stress disorder
and the care from his sisters was an “absolute necessity” for him to gain
some emotional stability for his ailment.167 
The court held that to remove an alien suffering from a mental illness 
to another country where the treatment facilities are inferior to those
available in the removing State, the removal might raise an issue under 
157. Id. at 7–8. 
158. See id. at 7.
 159. Id.
 160. Id.
 161. See id. at 6.
 162. Id. at 7. 
163. 
164. 
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Article 3, but only in a very exceptional case, where the humanitarian
grounds against the removal are compelling.168 The court articulated what 
grounds qualified as compelling, and specifically gave the example of an 
applicant in D. v. the United Kingdom, where exceptional circumstances
existed in that the applicant was critically ill and close to death, was not
guaranteed any nursing or medical care in his country of origin, and had
no family there able to provide him with food, shelter or social support.169 
In contrast, this court concluded that there was no indication that, if the 
present applicant were returned to Italy, he would lack appropriate 
psychological treatment and would not have access to anti-depressants of 
the kind that he was receiving in Switzerland.170 Concerning the applicant’s 
risk of suicide, the court held that a threat of suicide does not bar a state
from transferring an applicant back to another state, as long as “concrete 
measures are taken to prevent those threats from being realized.”171 
E. Why the ECtHR’s Opinion Matters 
Dublin III declares that a systemic flaw is found when a State’s asylum 
procedure and its reception conditions for applicants result in a “risk of 
inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4” of the 
CFR.172 Article 4 of the CFR is identical to Article 3 of the ECHR,173 
which the courts applied in M.S.S, and subsequent cases, when determining 
whether to send an asylum applicant back to the State he initially entered.174 
An Article 3 violation would therefore amount to a systemic flaw under 
Dublin III.175 
While it is the job of the CJEU to carry out EU law and Dublin III, Article 
52 of the CFR, which is binding on EU Member states, provides that so
far as the CFR contains rights guaranteed by the ECHR, the meaning and 
scope of those rights shall be the same as those in the ECHR.176 According 
168. See id. ¶ 31. 
169. See id.
 170. Id. ¶ 36. 
171. Id. ¶ 34. 
172.  Dublin III, supra note 15, art. 3. 
173. CFR, supra note 31, art. 4; ECHR, supra note 66, art. 3 (both stating “No one shall 
be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”). 
174. ECHR, supra note 66, art. 3.
 175. See M.S.S. v. Belgium, 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 367–68, HUDOC (Eur. Ct. H.R., Jan.
21, 2011) (holding that degrading treatment violated Article 3 of the UCHR). 
176. CFR, supra note 31, art. 52. 
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to Article 52 of the CFR, the meaning and scope of Article 4 of the CFR 
and Article 3 of the ECHR are the same.
Since the ECtHR’s opinion has been considered when interpreting EU 
law under the CFR before,177 particularly in M.S.S., and because Article 3 
of the CFR is identical to Article 3 of the ECHR, it would logically follow 
that the ECtHR’s opinion should be considered in determining a set definition 
for what constitutes a “systemic flaw” in a country’s asylum conditions 
and reception procedures. 
F. The Meaning of Systemic Flaws 
ECHR case law points to a definition of “systemic flaws” in a State’s 
asylum procedure and reception conditions. A systemic flaw would exist
if conditions in a Member State subject an asylum seeker to inhuman or
degrading treatment.178 Inhuman treatment is any treatment that causes 
either actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering, is premeditated,
and is applied for hours at a time.179  Degrading treatment is any treatment 
that humiliates or debases an individual, diminishes his or her human
dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking 
an individual’s moral and physical resistance.180 Inhuman and degrading
treatment is more readily established for children than adults, and a country 
would be found systemically flawed if there is a situation where asylum 
seekers that are minors are exposed to any situations of such stress and 
anxiety that it would create traumatic consequences.181 
More specifically, a systemic flaw would be found if asylum seekers 
have a lack of access to language interpreters, legal aid,182 adequate medical 
care,183 basic hygienic and sanitary facilities, or shelter.184 A flaw would 
also be found if applicants are held in detention facilities for more than 
six months.185 Lastly, if an applicant faces a risk of unfair deportation back 
177. See generally Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/10, N.S. v. Sec’y of State for the 
Home Dep’t, 2011 ECJ Eur-Lex LEXIS 3290 (Dec. 21, 2011) (The court considers the 
ECtHR’s decision in M.S.S.). 
178. ECHR, supra note 66, art. 3 (“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment”). 
179. See M.S.S. v. Belgium, 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 308. 
180. Id.
181. Tarakhel v. Switzerland, App. No. 29217/12, ¶ 19, HUDOC (Eur. Ct. H.R., Nov. 4,
2014).
182. Sharifi, supra note 122, at 4. 
183. See A.S. v. Switzerland, App. No. 39350/13, ¶ 31, HUDOC (Eur. Ct. H.R., June 
30, 2015). 
184. See M.S.S., 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 311–312. 
185. See id.
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to the country where he or she was fleeing due to inhuman or degrading
treatment then there would be a systemic flaw.186 
The severity of inhuman or degrading treatment that would trigger a 
systemic flaw need only be minimum.187 If a Member State has failed to 
meet these standards, that Member State would be barred from receiving 
asylum seekers transferred back to it by another Member State, similar to 
the present status of Greece. 
The flawed State would not be free of responsibility, would still be in 
violation of the EHCR and CFR, and would still be required to meet minimum 
reception standards for asylum seekers. The point of barring a country
from receiving transfer is not to absolve the Member State of its responsibilities 
to take in asylum seekers, but to provide acceptable conditions for the asylum
seeker, and to disperse the responsibility of receiving asylum seekers that 
is mostly concentrated in EU border States.
G. Systemic Flaws or Unfortunate Events 
One problem with finding systemic flaws in a State and then barring that
State completely, is whether one should look at the quality and the severity 
of the flaws or whether one should look at the quantity of asylum seekers 
affected, such as the number of asylum seekers facing risk of deportation, 
or inhuman and degrading treatment. 
Anna Lübbe, Professor at the University of Applied Sciences in Fulda, 
Germany, distinguishes violations of law caused by systemic flaws from
violations of law caused by what she calls an unfortunate series of events.188 
Lübbe states that an actual “systemic flaw,” as referred to in Dublin III, is 
a lack of structure in a State’s asylum system that, for asylum cases passing 
through that State, lead to an error.189 Furthermore, the lack of function in
a State’s asylum procedure is not dependent on the number of applicants
that are affected by the error, but more on the foreseeability and regularity
of the error in the system.190 In contrast, Lübbe states that an “unfortunate 
series of events” is an error that cannot be anticipated or avoided completely
 186. See Sharifi, supra note 122, at 6.
187.  Tarakhel v. Switzerland, App. No. 29217/12, ¶ 118. 
188. Anna Lübbe, ‘Systemic Flaws’ and Dublin Transfers: Incompatible Tests before the
CJEU and the ECtHR?, 27 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 135, 137 (2015). 
189. See id. 
190. See id. at 137–38. 
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by changing the regular procedures with the system, because it is 
unforeseeable.191 
Lübbe gives an example of her two types of errors by comparing a
systemic flaw to a technical system in plant production that produces bad 
or spoiled plants due to insufficient protection against overheating.192 She
observes that a change in the regular procedures within that system could 
prevent a further spoiling of plants due to overheating.193 In the case of an 
asylum seeker, an example of this type of systemic flaw would be a system
that fails to look at asylum applicants individually, and subjects applicants 
to a risk of unfair deportation by mass or group deportation.
In contrast, an unfortunate series of events, would be an event such as
the spilling of paint on the plants, causing them to spoil.194 Lübbe says that 
such accidents cannot be avoided by changing the regular procedures within
the system, and they may happen again, but not in a predictable manner.195 
In a more relevant example, she compares the unfortunate series of events
to an asylum seeker who is subject to deportation due to mistaken identity
(i.e. a human error or mistake of an officer processing asylum claims).196 
Lübbe distinguishes an asylum system that lacks control mechanisms 
and thus regularly produces such errors, for example, an asylum system 
that constantly produces errors because five case officers are dealing with 
thousands of applications.197 She concludes that the example of 5 officers 
would be a systemic flaw, because even though each error is unforeseeable
alone, in the whole, the error of understaffed officers making a mistake is 
foreseeable and a change, such as more staff, could prevent those errors.198 
She combats this problem by arguing that the question of whether errors 
in law are due to systemic flaws or not depends—as far as accidental
errors are concerned—on whether the error can be remedied by a fault
prevention mechanism within an asylum system.199 She concludes that the
number and severity of incidents are important, but only as they pertain to
accidents, such as mistaken identity or spilt paint, but since this concerns 
only accidental errors, severe or frequent incidents are not essential for an 
error to be a systemic flaw;200 therefore, one could claim that there is a
 191. See id. at 138. 
192. Id. at 137. 
193. See id.
 194. See id.
 195. Id.
 196. Id.
 197. See id. at 139. 
198. See id.
 199. See id. at 138. 
200. See id. at 139. 
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systemic flaw in a country’s asylum procedure, even if the flaw only affects
a small number of applicants. 
According to Professor Lübbe, the best way to analyze a systemic flaw 
in a system would be to look at the internal mechanisms or structure of
the system itself, and not necessarily the number or quantity of asylum
applicants affected.201 What sets the systemic flaw apart from an unfortunate
series of events would the foreseeability. For example, the applicant in 
A.S. v. Switzerland, who claimed to be an adult, but was actually a minor, 
and who had sisters in Switzerland whom he needed for his medical condition 
would be a system coping with an unfortunate series of events. The Italian 
asylum system could have dealt with the applicant properly if he had told 
them he was a minor, and although the applicant needed his sisters for his 
mental medical condition, there was no reason to believe he would not 
receive proper medical care in Italy.202 The foreseeability of the applicant’s
plight in A.S. is not significant enough to be considered a systemic flaw, 
and it more analogous to the Lübbe’s spilt can of paint, or an unfortunate 
event. 
An example of a systemic flaw would be the situation in M.S.S., where 
Greek authorities were receiving a large number of applicants, and placing
them in detention with lack of sufficient ventilation, forcing them to
urinate in bottles, and to sleep on a bare floor.203 This situation may be an
unfortunate series of events, but due to the number and nature of the
incidents, overall this would be a major lack in the Greek system which is 
unable to cope with the number of asylum seekers crossing into its borders, 
and it would amount to a systemic flaw within the meaning of Dublin III
and the ECtHR. 
IV. DUBLIN III’S LACK OF A SOLUTION
After the M.S.S and N.S. made the EU aware of the systemic flaws in 
the Greece asylum procedure, one might have expected that a solution
would have been added to the new Dublin III recast that followed. That 
“solution” is found in Article 33 of Dublin III, but, Article 33 fails to solve 
the overall problem that plagues Dublin III and countries like Greece and 
Italy.
 201. See id. at 138. 
202. See A.S. v. Switzerland, App. No. 39350/13, ¶ 7. 
203. M.S.S. v. Belgium, 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 311, HUDOC (Eur. Ct. H.R., Jan.
21, 2011). 
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A. Dublin III and Mutual Trust 
The entire Dublin system, including the I, II, and III models, is based
on the principle of mutual trust between Member States.204 The Dublin 
system functions with an allocation of responsibility for asylum seekers 
based on a take charge or take back rationale, and it assumes that each
Member State will examine asylum seeker’s claims and act in accordance 
with the relevant rules of national, European Union, and international 
law.205 The Court in N.S. even states that “[c]onsideration of the texts which 
constitute the Common European Asylum System shows that it was conceived
in a context making it possible to assume that all the participating States
[. . .] observe fundamental rights [. . .] and that the Member States can 
have confidence in each other in that regard.”206 The court says later on in 
N.S. that “[a] transfer does violate Article 4 of the Charter, however, when
Member States cannot be unaware that there are substantial grounds for 
believing that systemic flaws and deficiencies in the procedure and
reception conditions for asylum seekers in the responsible Member State 
will result in a real risk that the asylum seeker will be subjected to inhuman 
or degrading treatment,” challenges that same principle of mutual trust
inherent in the Dublin Regulation.207 By acknowledging that a Member
State’s asylum procedure and reception conditions are systemically flawed, a
Member State can no longer mechanically rely on another Member State
to be in accordance with EU laws and regulations. 
Dublin III also mentions mutual trust in its proposed solutions to systemic
deficiencies in a country’s reception procedures and conditions. In its
preamble, Dublin III says “[d]eficiencies in, or the collapse of, asylum 
systems . . . can jeopardise the smooth functioning of the system put in 
place under this Regulation, which could lead to a risk of a violation of
the rights.”208 It goes on to say, “A process for early warning, preparedness
and management of asylum crises serving to prevent a deterioration in, or 
the collapse of, asylum systems . . . should be established.”209 Lastly, it states, 
“Such a process should ensure that the Union is alerted as soon as possible 
when there is a concern that the smooth functioning of the system set up 
by this Regulation is being jeopardised as a result of particular pressure
204.  Van den Sanden, supra note 14, at 165–66. 
205. Id.
206. Joined Cases C-411/10 & C-493/10, N.S. v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t,
2011 ECJ Eur-Lex LEXIS 3290 ¶ 78. 
207. Id. ¶ 94. 
208.  Dublin III, supra note 15, ¶ 21. 
209. Id. at ¶ 22.
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on, and/or deficiencies in, the asylum systems of one or more Member
States.”210 
This portion of Dublin III addresses that flaws in an asylum procedure 
may exist, and that a process should be in place to deal with this problem,
however, it hardly makes any mention of what the solution could be, and 
instead it states that “[s]olidarity . . . goes hand in hand with mutual trust. 
By enhancing such trust, the process for early warning, preparedness, and 
management of asylum crises could improve the steering of concrete measures 
of genuine and practical solidarity towards Member States, in order to assist 
the affected Member States.”211 
Here, Dublin III, is trying to adhere to the original principle of mutual 
trust amongst the Member States, however, at this point the mutual trust 
has already been broken by the violating Member State. Therefore, the
original mutual trust that the court in N.S. mentioned, and inherent in the 
original Dublin Regulation, should no longer be an independent factor when 
handing the management of asylum crises.
B. No Solution in Dublin III 
Article 33 of Dublin III deals with the mechanism for early warning, 
preparedness and crisis management of asylum refugees. If there are
problems in a Member State’s asylum procedures, Article 33 requires that
State to draw up a preventative action plan in order to overcome the 
pressure or problems in the functioning of its asylum system.212 In its plan, 
the Member State concerned is required to address all appropriate measures
to deal with the situation of particular pressure on its asylum system and
to ensure that the deficiencies identified are addressed before the situation
213worsens.
Article 33 further pronounces that when a Member State is drawing up 
a preventive action plan, the Member State may call for the assistance of 
the Commission, and other Member States,214 and that “[t]he European
Parliament and the Council may, throughout the entire process, discuss 
and provide guidance on any solidarity measures as they deem appropriate.”215
 210. 
211. 
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Article 33 does not mention the responsibility or obligation of the other 
Member States to aid the other struggling Member.216 Furthermore, Article
33, and all the rest of Dublin III for that matter, makes no mention of the 
heightened pressure on border countries who, due to their location, take in 
more asylum seekers.217 A practical solution for a country’s flawed asylum
procedures is not to be found in Article 33 of Dublin III.218 
C. Recent Council Decision on Dublin III 
An attempt to remedy the asylum crisis was made in an EU Council 
decision in September of 2015.219 The decision took place as a result of a
joint meeting of Foreign and Interior Ministers in April of 2015.220 At the
April meeting, the Commission presented a ten-point plan of immediate
action to be taken in response to the crisis, which included a commitment
to consider options for an emergency relocation mechanism.221 The 
emergency relocation mechanism was put to paper in the EU Council
decision of September of 2015, which was titled “establishing provisional 
measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and 
Greece.”222 The decision entailed the relocation of 120,000 applicants
from Greece and Italy to other Member States.223 The Council had authority
to make such a decision under Article 78(3) of the TFEU, which says that 
“in the event of one or more Member States being confronted by an emergency
situation characterised by a sudden inflow of nationals of third countries, 
the Council [. . .] may adopt provisional measures for the benefit of the 
Member State(s) concerned.”224 
Unlike Dublin III, the Council decision addresses the unequal burden 
on the southern border States.225 The Council declares that there is a need 
for “fair sharing of responsibility and to step up its efforts in this area towards 
those Member States which receive the highest number of refugees and
applicants [. . .]”226 The Council also notes that “Several Member States
[Greece and Italy] were confronted with a significant increase in the total 
216. See id. art. 33
 217. 
218. 
See generally Dublin III, supra note 15. 
See id. art. 33.
219. Council Decision 2015/1601, Establishing Provisional Measures in the Area of 
International Protection for the Benefit of Italy and Greece, 2015 O.J. (L 248) 80 (EU)
[hereinafter Council Decision].
220. Id.
 221. See id.
 222. Id. at 82. 
223. Id. art. 4
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number of migrants[. . .]” and that “[d]uring recent months, the migratory 
pressure at the southern external land and sea borders has again sharply 
increased [. . .] [i]n view of the situation, further provisional measures to
relieve the asylum pressure from Italy and Greece should be warranted.”227 
Beside the relocation of asylum seekers, the decision mentions more aid
options for Italy and Greece.228 Article 7 mandates operational support to
Italy and Greece in handling their asylum procedures such as fingerprinting, 
registration, and identification.229 Article 10 also sets out a plan to provide
financial support to Greece and Italy in a lump sum.230 
While the actions in the Council Decision indicates good progress 
toward remedying the situations in Greece and Italy, the actions are only 
small steps toward solving the overall problem, and much more action is 
required in order for a significant change to take place. 
First, the 120,000 migrants to be relocated, while substantial, is only a 
fraction compared to the number of migrants seeking asylum in the EU.
In its September decision, the Council says that since the beginning of 2015,
approximately 116,000 migrants have arrived in Italy, and 211,000 have 
arrived in Greece in less than a year’s time.231 Second, the operational and
financial support mandates are suitable as supplements, but by themselves 
may distract from larger solutions, such as reallocating more refugees.
Lastly, even after the decision requiring the allocation of migrants, there 
is no assurance that the other Member States will comply. Hungary, who built 
a fence to deflect migrants from crossing its borders, along with the Czech
Republic, Poland, and Slovakia, have all rejected the EU’s quota plan for 
distributing migrants across the continent, and have instead called for tighter
border controls and other steps to reduce the migrant influx.232 
V. FINDING A SOLUTION
Progress toward finding a solution may come with finding a set definition 
of what “systemic flaws” are, and once a Member State, a southern border 
State most likely, reaches the level of flawed, then that Member State
 227. See id. at 81. 
228. Id. 
229. See id. at 90–91. 
230. See id. at 91. 
231. See id. at 81. 
232. Czech, Slovak PMs the Latest to Slam Greece on Migrant Crisis, YAHOO NEWS
(Jan. 26, 2016), http://news.yahoo.com/slovak-pm-says-eu-migrant-policy-ritual-suicide­
105419285.html [https://perma.cc/TMZ2-UW5S]. 
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would be automatically barred from taking refugees back from other
States, and released from the responsibility of having to relocate that
asylum seeker within its own borders. This release of responsibility would 
be due to the unequal share of refugees the flawed Member State has to
process. Implementing such procedures would require other changes such
as streamlining the process, relying on joint task forces rather than national 
authorities, and finally recognizing the unequal share of burden to Member 
States that lie on the border, and assigning different responsibilities to the 
border and central countries. 
A. Automatic Barring of “Systemically Flawed” Member State 
Since the M.S.S. and N.S. decisions, the ECtHR has virtually banned any 
transfer of asylum seekers back to Greece.233 The ECtHR and the CJEU
have not been as consistent with other countries, however, as seen in cases
dealing with Italy. In Tarakhel, the court found an Article 3 violation if 
the applicant were sent back to Italy;234 yet, in A.M.E., which was decided 
a year later, the court said, “that the current structure and situation of
reception arrangements in Italy could not themselves bar all removals of
asylum seekers in Italy, and that conditions were not as bad as those in 
Greece when M.S.S. was decided.”235 A solution to this inconsistency would 
be an elaborated definition of “systemic flaws” of a Member State’s reception
procedure, and then a system that would automatically bar transfers to that 
Member State after it is found not meeting that standard. The Commission
has originally proposed a mechanism similar to this, that would have 
automatically required Member States to halt Dublin transfers, on a temporary
basis, to countries where asylum seekers would likely face poor reception 
conditions, but strong objections from other Member State governments 
prohibited the inclusion of this barring mechanism.236 Due to the increasing 
number of refugees coming into Europe, however, the Member States that 
once opposed the mechanism may be more receptive to it. 
Having a Member State automatically barred puts other EU Members 
on notice not to send asylum seekers back to that country, rather than
having to weigh the situation and putting as asylum seeker at risk of in 
human or degrading treatment. Further, having these countries flagged as 
“flawed” indicates a target for where resources and manpower should be 
allocated. 
233. FRATZKE, supra note 22, at 11. 
234.  Tarakhel v. Switzerland, App. No. 29217/12, ¶ 121. 
235. A.M.E. v. the Netherlands, App. No. 51428/10, ¶ 35, HUDOC (Eur. Ct. H.R., 
Jan. 13, 2015). 
236. FRATZKE, supra note 22, at 21. 
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B. Additional Measures 
Even if a Member State has been barred, refugees would not stop seeking 
asylum in that country; therefore, in order to resolve the deficiencies in a 
Member States asylum procedures, other solutions would be required. 
The first step in this process would be creating a joint agency that would 
truly share in the asylum process. Scholars agree that while Dublin III was 
not created as a burden-sharing mechanism, procedures that would implement
sharing responsibility could possibly be what Dublin III needs in order to 
succeed.237 Susan Fratzke, Policy Analyst for Migration Policy Institute, 
suggests expanding cooperation mechanisms such as inserting liaison
officers, and pooling reception facilities together as a way to increase the
size and scope of sharing integration and reception capacity.238 
A large part of the solution might rely on creating a supranational agency
that can move throughout the EU and is not part of any one government. 
This agency could create reception centers in border countries that have
been deemed “systemically flawed,” and it would be tasked with moving
the asylum seekers out of the inundated border states to the other central 
Member States. In order to prevent asylum shopping, a lottery system or 
bidding process could be put in place when deciding where to transfer the
asylum seeker. Creating such an agency may take years, however, and interim 
measures may be required until then; such measures may include, creating
a temporary agency that consists of the closest surrounding Member States, 
or designating specific roads and railways as refugee transports that could 
alleviate the flooded border countries. Further, once a Member State has 
been marked as “flawed,” it may be beneficial to mark the next closest State
as the new “reception center,” and move refugees through to that State.239 
Implementing this system would require Member States to give up some
of their sovereign power, which could prove problematic in the future. At 
a recent summit, a measure to create an EU border and coastguard with 
power to overrule national governments when EU borders are deemed
insecure, was met with strong support from big countries like Germany
and France, but many of the other Member States viewed it as an assault 
on national sovereignty.240 Those countries who are concerned about
 237. Id. at 24. 
238. See id. at 25. 
239. 
240. 
For example, moving refuges through Italy straight to France, Austria, or Switzerland.
See Ian Taylor, Refugee Crisis: EU Summit Exposes Impotence and Unfulfilled 
Pledges, GUARDIAN (Dec. 17, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/17/ 
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national sovereignty, however, may risk exposure to Dublin III violations
without the extra measures proposed at the summit. Since, the M.S.S. 
decision, the ECtHR and CJEU have held, not only that “systemically
flawed” States are accountable, but that other Member States attempting
to transfer the asylum seeker back to the country with the flawed asylum 
procedure are as well.241 Following this logic, a Member State cannot escape
responsibility simply because it was not initially responsible for an asylum 
seeker, thus creating a need for better mechanisms of equal burden sharing. 
Implementing these changes to the Dublin Regulation and the EU asylum
process will require Member States to compromise, and to make changes 
to their own national procedures. While giving up some national sovereignty 
has met opposition in the past, there have been great strides and purposeful 
changes made in the Dublin Regulation in the past, demonstrated by the
Dublin II and Dublin III recasts, and it is possible that new, constructive 
changes could be implemented in a Dublin IV recast in the future. 
refugee-crisis-eu-summit-exposes-impotence-and-unfulfilled-pledges [https://perma.cc/
M7QG-MX7R].
241. See generally M.S.S. v. Belgium, 2011-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 255 (2011). 
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